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Abstract—Display advertising is an important online ad-
vertising type where banner advertisements (shortly ad) on
websites are usually measured by how many times they are
viewed by online users. There are two major channels to
sell ad views. They can be auctioned off in real time or be
directly sold through guaranteed contracts in advance. The
former is also known as real-time bidding (RTB), in which
media buyers come to a common marketplace to compete for
a single ad view and this inventory will be allocated to a
buyer in milliseconds by an auction model. Unlike RTB, buying
and selling guaranteed contracts are not usually programmatic
but through private negotiations as advertisers would like to
customise their requests and purchase ad views in bulk. In
this paper, we propose a simple model that facilitates the
automation of direct sales. In our model, a media seller puts
future ad views on sale and receives buy requests sequentially
over time until the future delivery period. The seller maintains
a hidden yet dynamically changing reserve price in order to
decide whether to accept a buy request or not. The future
supply and demand are assumed to be well estimated and
static, and the model’s revenue management is using inventory
control theory where each computed reverse price is based on
the updated supply and demand, and the unsold future ad
views will be auctioned off in RTB to the meet the unfulﬁlled
demand. The model has several desirable properties. First, it is
not limited to the demand arrival assumption. Second, it will
not affect the current equilibrium between RTB and direct sales
as there are no posted guaranteed prices. Third, the model uses
the expected revenue from RTB as a lower bound for inventory
control and we show that a publisher can receive expected total
revenue greater than or equal to those from only RTB if she
uses the computed dynamic reserves prices for direct sales.
Keywords-Display advertising; programmatic guarantee; dy-
namic inventory control; risk-aware modelling; reserve prices
I. INTRODUCTION
Display advertising – a type of online advertising that
mainly comes with banner ads to deliver marketing messages
to site visitors – has emerged as a new global industry
as billions of dollars are spent every year for ad views.
Each ad view is also called an impression. According to
eMarketer1, display advertising revenues mainly come from
two channels: RTB and direct sales. The former, as the
1http://www.emarketer.com
name implies, is a real-time, impression-level, auction-based
sales system, in which media buyers come to a common
marketplace like ad exchange to compete with each other
for a single impression from their targeted users. RTB was
initially proposed in 2007 [1], which has brought automa-
tion, integration, and liquidity into selling impressions non-
guaranteedly, changing the landscape of the market. Direct
sales have a longer history, which can be traced back to
1994, when HotWired (today Wired News, part of Lycos)
singed fourteen banner ads with AT&T, Club Med and Coorz
Zima, being considered as the start of display advertising [2].
Guaranteed contracts can customise media buyers’ requests
and provide a way to lock in advertising opportunities in
advance. However, they are still mainly agreed through
private negotiations, which is slow and less efﬁcient in
front of large inventory volumes and rapid market changes.
Both media buyers and sellers are looking to programmatic
technology or automatic system to buy and sell impressions
in advance, bypassing traditional direct sales [3].
Programmatic guarantee (PG) has therefore become a
popular topic recently. It is often synonymous with pro-
grammatic reserved, programmatic upfront and forward [3],
[4]. Essentially, PG is a sales system that helps media
sellers such as publishers and supply-side platforms (SSPs)
to automatically sells future impressions through guaranteed
contracts to media buyers such as advertisers and demand-
side platforms (DSPs). Below are several notable examples
from both buy-side and sell-side markets:
• Google DoubleClick’s Programmatic Guaranteed;
• AOL’s Programmatic Upfront;
• Rubicon Project’s Reserved Premium Media Buys;
• BuySellAds’s Direct Sales;
• ShinyAds’s Programmatic Direct Advertising Platform.
Many PG products or platforms have been developed
since 2013 and there is no widely recognised models for
them. This is different to RTB, where the Second-Price (SP)
auction and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction have
been implemented on most of platforms [5]. In addition,
since in RTB each impression is auctioned off, the expected
revenues from SP and VCG are equivalent [6]; therefore,
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Figure 1. Schematic views of transactions (or business models) in RTB,
traditional direct sales, passive PG and active PG.
we usually consider RTB based on SP auctions. Below we
summarise some functionalities and common facts of PG.
First, there is no competition in PG. For each transaction,
there are only one seller and one buyer at a time. Second,
there is no need to model the arrival of supply in PG as
the inventory is the impressions that will be created in
the future period but not now. However, the prediction of
supply in the future period is important. Third, the arrival
of demand needs to be considered, no matter whether it is
considered as a queue or shifting from future prediction.
Fourth, there is no negotiation process in PG. In its design,
either a buyer submits her request or a seller posts the
guaranteed inventory price publicly. In this paper, we call
the former the passive PG and the later the active PG.
A passive PG usually comes with hidden reserve prices
to automatically accept the buyer’s request. Many current
PGs adopt this design. An active PG is similar to an airline
booking system [7], in which media buyers can monitor
the evolution of the guaranteed prices and then adjust their
advertising strategies between RTB and PG. This will also
affect the current balance of the two markets but will
achieve a new equilibrium by using the posted prices to
affect advertisers’ demand. For the reader’s convenience, the
key components of the mentioned display advertising sales
systems are summarised in Fig. 1.
In this paper, we discuss a simple dynamic model for a
passive PG where a publisher allows advertisers to submit
guaranteed buy requests to purchase their targeted future
impressions in advance. The model calculates a hidden
reserve price to decide whether to accept a buy request or
not. To simplify the discussion without loss of generality,
we consider each buy request contains a single impression
and requests arrive one by one over time (as a queue).
The reserve price calculation is based on the updated dual
force of supply and demand, and the unsold impressions
will be auctioned off in RTB to the meet the unfulﬁlled
demand in the delivery period. The model can be easily
applied to the case of bulk sales. Inventory control theory
has been employed for revenue management and we use
the expected revenue from future RTB as a lower bound.
The model is not optimal while it still has several desirable
properties. Firstly, it is not limited to the demand arrival
assumption because there are not posted prices to affect
demand, and the model also doesn’t need to ﬁnd a global
optimality for revenue maximisation. Second, it will not
affect the current equilibrium between RTB and direct sales
because the reserve prices are not disclosed. Third, we show
that a seller can receive an increased expected total revenue
compared to RTB if she uses the computed dynamic reserves
prices for her direct sales.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
reviews the related literature. In Section III, we formulate the
problem, discuss assumptions and provide a solution. Sec-
tion IV presents the results of our experimental evaluation
and Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Several recent developments of guaranteed delivery sys-
tems in both display advertising and sponsored search are
reviewed in this section.
The allocation of impressions between guaranteed and
non-guaranteed channels was investigated through various
approaches. Feldman et al. [8] studied an algorithm that
can allocate and match ads for display advertising, in which
the publisher’s objective is not only to fulﬁl the guaranteed
contracts but also to deliver the well-targeted impressions to
advertisers. The algorithm allows for free disposal so that
advertisers are indifferent to, or prefer being assigned more
than a certain number of impressions without changing the
contract terms. Ghosh et al. [9] considered the publisher as
a bidder to bid for guaranteed contracts so that impressions
would be possible allocated to auctions only if the winning
bids are high enough. Balseiro et al. [10] used stochastic
control theory to model the decision-making in the same
scenario. Roels and Fridgeirsdottir [11] further proposed
several control heuristics in revenue maximisation. Given
static supply and demand, optimal posted guaranteed prices
were recently discussed by Chen et al. [12].
Other related contributions include: a lightweight alloca-
tion framework for guaranteed impressions that simpliﬁes
the computations in optimisation and to let real servers to
allocate ads efﬁciently and with little overhead [13]; two
contract pricing algorithms to calculate the price of selling
guaranteed impressions in bulk [14]; guaranteed delivery
mechanisms with cancellations (for media seller) [15], [16]
Ad options are a special type of guaranteed delivery
systems worthing to be mentioned [17], [18], [19], [20], in
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Figure 2. A schematic illustration of using risk-aware dynamic reserve
prices to buy and sell guaranteed impressions in display advertising.
which an advertiser is guaranteed a priority buying right
(but not obligation) of her targeted future inventories. She
usually pays a small amount upfront and then can decide
to pay a ﬁxed price to obtain the inventories or not in the
delivery period or contract expiration date. She can join
keyword auctions or RTB in the future if she thinks they are
less expensive. The only cost would be the prepaid option
price. Compared to guaranteed contracts, ad options provide
advertisers with great ﬂexibility.
III. THE MODEL
In display advertising, a publisher may have several
webpages. On a webpage, there exists one or more slots
(or placements) to display banner ads. When an online user
visits a publisher’s webpage, an ad slot can generate a chance
of ad view (i.e, the impression), which is usually auctioned
off in RTB, where advertisers compete in a SP auction and
the winner will be able to have her ad displayed to the
user. This impression can also be sold in advance through
a guaranteed contract and our proposed model brings au-
tomation into selling guaranteed impressions. To simplify the
discussion without loss of generality, we consider a single
publisher, single webpage, single slot, and single impression
at a time in the modelling. It should be noted that guaranteed
impressions are usually sold in bulk in real businesses and
our model can be easily applied to the bulk sales case.
The model can also be used by a SSP for selling premium
impressions and/or from a speciﬁc user group.
Fig. 2 presents a simple schematic illustration of our
model. We assume the targeted impressions will be created
in the period [T, T˜ ], and they can also be sold in advance
through guaranteed contracts in the period [0, T ]. Advertisers
can submit buy requests one by one (as a queue) and each
request is for a single impression. The publisher will decide
whether to accept or reject a buy request based on a reserve
price, which is determined by the updated information of
dual force of supply of and demand for impressions in the
period [T, T˜ ]. Finally, the remaining impressions and the
unfulﬁlled demand will go to RTB in the period [T, T˜ ].
Here we use J1, J2, · · · to denote discrete time periods for
guaranteed buy requests and each period contains only one
accepted buy request.
A. Dynamic Decision Making
Let V (t, s) be the publisher’s value function at time
t, representing the expected total value of s remaining
impressions which will be created and delivered in the future
period [T, T˜ ]. Suppose if an advertiser submits a buy request
to the publisher and proposes a guaranteed price G(t) for
an impression for targeted users, the publisher’s decision
making at time t can be simply expressed as
max
x(t)∈{0,1}
{
R(t)x(t) + V
(
t+ δt, s− x(t)
)}
,
where x(t) is the decision variable with binary outcomes,
R(t) is the expected revenue that can be obtained. Therefore,
given a buy request, the publisher’s decision making will
be based on the maximisation of the sum of the current
expected revenue and the expected revenue of future. As
the publisher may fail to deliver the guaranteed impression
in the future, her expected penalty needs to be considered.
Let ω be the probability that the publisher fails to deliver
the guaranteed impression in the delivery period and let γ
be the size of penalty – if the publisher fails to deliver the
guaranteed impression that is sold at G(t), she needs to pay
γG(t) penalty to the advertiser.
Given time t and s remaining impressions, suppose that
the advertiser proposes a guaranteed price that makes the
publisher’s two decisions indifferent – choosing either will
give her equivalent beneﬁts. We consider this price the lower
bound of reserve price for the guaranteed impression and
denote it by r(t, s) as the price will be affected by both time
and remaining impressions. Mathematically, r(t, s) can be
expressed as
r(t, s) =
1
1− γω
(
V (t+ δt, s)− V (t+ δt, s− 1)
)
. (1)
Then the decision variable x(t) = I{G(t)≥r(t,s)}, where I{·}
is the indicator function. Applying the Bellman’s Principle
of Optimality [7] then gives
V (t, s)
= E
[
max
x(t)
{
r(t, s)(1 − γω)x(t) + V (t+ δt, s− x(t))
}]
= P
[
G(t) ≥ r(t, s)
](
r(t, s)(1 − γω) + V (t+ δt, s− 1)
)
+
(
1− P
[
G(t) ≥ r(t, s)
])
V (t+ δt, s).
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In the same way, V (t+δt, s) can be obtained. By Eq. (1),
r(t + δt, s) is deﬁned, then V (t + δt, s) = V (t + 2δt, s).
Substituting the publisher’s value functions into Eq. (1) gives
r(t+δt, s) = r(t+2δt, s). Same checking can be applied to
multiple steps, and we then ﬁnd that the publisher’s value
function and the reserve price are both time independent.
For any k ∈ [t, T ], V (t, s) = V (k, s), r(t, s) = r(k, s).
Hence, if the publisher keeps selling impressions at the lower
bounds of reserve prices, her expected marginal revenues
are always equal to her expected marginal costs, and her
expected total value will be keeping at the same level up to
the terminal time T .
B. Terminal Value
Let S and Q be the expected total supply of and demand
for impressions that will be created in the period [T, T˜ ],
respectively. Consider if S − s impressions have been sol-
d in advance through guaranteed contracts in the period
[0, T ] and there are s remaining impressions which will
be auctioned off in RTB in the period [T, T˜ ]. Recall that
the sold impressions have also fulﬁlled S − s demand and
unfulﬁlled Q − (S − s) demand will join RTB. The pub-
lisher’s value function at time T , also called terminal value,
can be obtained by V (T, s) = sφ(ξ), where ξ is the per-
impression demand (i.e., the number of advertisers) and φ(·)
is the function which computes the estimated per-impression
payment price in RTB for the given demand level. Since
there are s remaining impressions and Q−(S−s) remaining
demand, then ξ = (Q− S)/s+ 1.
As advertisers usually bid for impressions separately in
RTB [1], it can be considered as a single-item auction where
GSP and VCG auction models have equivalent expected
revenues. Therefore, φ(·) can be obtained as follows
φ(ξ) =
∫
x∈Ω
xξ(ξ − 1)g(x)
(
1− F(x)
)(
F(x)
)ξ−2
dx,
where x is an advertiser’s bid in RTB, g(·) is the density
function, F(·) is the cumulative distribution function, so
ξ(ξ− 1)g(x)(1−F(x))(F(x))ξ−2 represents the probability
that if an advertiser who bids at x is the second highest
bidder, then one of ξ − 1 other advertisers must bid at least
as much as she does and all of ξ − 2 other advertisers have
to bid no more than she does.
Bid distribution can be speciﬁed by either probabilistic or
empirical method. In probabilistic way, uniform distribution
and log-normal distribution have been widely discussed for
online advertising auctions [21], [22], [23]. If bid X ∼
U[0, v], where v is the advertiser’s expected value on an
impression, then φ(ξ) = v(ξ − 1)/(ξ + 1). If bid X ∼
LN(μ, σ2), where μ and σ are mean and standard deviation,
then φ(ξ) can be obtained via numerical integration. Proba-
bilistic methods offer many statistical properties while they
are not valid empirically in many situations [12], [24], [20].
In this paper, we learn φ(·) from data empirically by using
the robust locally weighted regression (RLWR) method [12].
Other statistical learning methods can be discussed but we
are not going to further investigate them here.
Up to now, the terminal value V (T, s) has been discussed
in a risk-free setting where the reserve price of a guaranteed
impression is computed based only on the rebalanced supply
of and demand for impressions in the period [T, T˜ ]. Howev-
er, once guaranteed impressions are sold, the publisher take
the risk of payment price movement of impressions and the
guaranteed selling will affect other advertisers in RTB. The
risk externalities can be measured by the standard deviation
of the expected payment with regard to the competition level
ξ, and the terminal value V (T, s) can be then expressed as
V (T, s) =
{
s
(
φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ)
)
, if π(ξ) ≥ φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ),
sπ(ξ), if π(ξ) < φ(ξ) + λψ(ξ),
where ψ(·) and π(·) are functions which compute the
standard deviation of payment and the expected winning
bid for the given ξ, respectively, and λ is the level of risk
aversion of the publisher.
C. Revenue Analysis
In the following discussion, RRTB denotes the expected
total revenue of selling all S impressions in RTB, then
RRTB = Sφ(Q/S),
andRPG+RTB denotes the expected total revenue of selling
some impressions in advance through guaranteed contracts
and selling the remaining impressions in RTB, then
RPG+RTB =
T∑
t=0
R(t)x(t) +
(
S −
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
φ(ξ∗),
where ξ∗ =
Q−
∑
T
t=0
x(t)
S−
∑
T
t=0
x(t)
.
Let M be a set such that x(t) = 1 for all t ∈ M. If
M = ∅, then RPG+RTB = RRTB; if M = ∅, then
RPG+RTB
=
∑
t∈M
G(t)(1 − γω)x(t) +
(
S −
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
φ(ξ∗)
≥
∑
t∈M
r
(
t, S −
∑
k∈[0,t]
x(k)
)
(1− γω) +
(
S −
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
φ(ξ∗)
=
∑
t∈M
(
V
(
t, S −
∑
k∈[0,t)
x(k)
)
− V
(
t, S −
∑
k∈[0,t]
x(k)
))
+
(
S −
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
φ(ξ∗)
= Sφ(Q/S) + Sλψ(Q/S)−
(
S −
T∑
t=0
x(t)
)
λψ(ξ∗).
If λ = 0, thenRPG+RTB ≥ RRTB. If λ > 0 and z(ς)
′ ≥ 0,
thenRPG+RTB ≥ RRTB, where z(ς) = ςψ((Q−S+ς)/ς).
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Table I
RTB DATASETS.
Dataset SSP-01 SSP-02 DSP
Market UK UK China
From 08 Jan 2013 01 Jan 2014 19 Oct 2013
To 14 Feb 2013 07 Jan 2014 27 Oct 2013
No. of ad slots 31 14 53571
No. of user tags NA 16600 69
No. of publishers NA 5932 NA
No. of advertisers 374 NA 4
No. of impressions 6646643 7752546 3158171
No. of bids 33043127 7752546 11457419
Bid quote GBP/CPM GBP/CPM CNY/CPM
Bids of each auction
√
NA NA
Reserve price NA
√
NA
Winning bid
√ √ √
Winning payment
√ √ √
2013-01-20 00 2013-01-27 00
Time (hourly scaled)
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Figure 3. An empirical example of RTB campaigns (at hourly time scale)
of an ad slot in the SSP-01 dataset.
Although the model is not optimal, we have shown in
which conditions that RPG+RTB is equal to or higher than
RRTB. Therefore, the publisher’ expected revenue can be
increased. A proper adjusting the publisher’s risk preference
will also encourage the model to increase the expected
revenue to advertiser’s expected value – the upper bound
of any sales model. However, the higher reserve prices may
also reject many buy requests, and encourage advertisers
to join RTB in the delivery period. In essence, the model
won’t affect the demand of guaranteed buy requests directly,
it is revenue management is based on inventory dynamic
allocation.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe our datasets, investigate RTB
campaigns, discuss the estimation of model parameters, and
evaluate the model’s revenue performance.
A. Data and Experimental Design
Table I brieﬂy summarises the used datasets: two datasets
from a SSP in the UK over the periods from 08 Jan
Table II
EVALUATION STATISTICS OF SURFACE REGRESSION MODELS.
Demand Supply
Model L2 norm L2 norm L2 norm L2 norm
average std. average std.
PNR(5,5) 0.2887 0.2544 0.2235 0.2375
PNR(4,5) 0.1123 0.0824 0.0938 0.0662
PNR(3,5) 0.0875 0.0507 0.0786 0.0503
PNR(2,5) 0.0623 0.0435 0.0482 0.0285
PNR(1,5) 0.0449 0.0309 0.0441 0.0276
PNR(5,4) 0.2979 0.2534 0.2207 0.2379
PNR(4,4) 0.0874 0.0661 0.0605 0.0434
PNR(3,4) 0.0856 0.0494 0.0737 0.0493
PNR(2,4) 0.0597 0.0415 0.0406 0.0234
PNR(1,4) 0.0496 0.0338 0.0431 0.0271
PNR(5,3) 0.3024 0.2538 0.2248 0.2374
PNR(4,3) 0.0877 0.0662 0.0607 0.0433
PNR(3,3) 0.0736 0.0455 0.0735 0.0517
PNR(2,3) 0.0579 0.0394 0.0447 0.0256
PNR(1,3) 0.0476 0.0332 0.0453 0.0280
PNR(5,2) 0.3061 0.2546 0.2346 0.2368
PNR(4,2) 0.0896 0.0674 0.0680 0.0456
PNR(3,2) 0.0789 0.0490 0.0767 0.0534
PNR(2,2) 0.0622 0.0417 0.0462 0.0267
PNR(1,2) 0.0529 0.0369 0.0471 0.0273
PNR(5,1) 0.2807 0.2562 0.2401 0.2340
PNR(4,1) 0.0880 0.0691 0.0651 0.0438
PNR(3,1) 0.0804 0.0483 0.0761 0.0538
PNR(2,1) 0.0672 0.0430 0.0478 0.0310
PNR(1,1) 0.0566 0.0377 0.0480 0.0307
LQR 0.0592 0.0354 0.0546 0.0363
2013 to 14 Feb 2013, and from 01 Jan 2014 to 07 Jan
2014; and a dataset from a DSP in China over the period
from 19 Oct 2013 to 27 Oct 2013. These datasets contain
different information of RTB campaigns; therefore, they are
used differently in experiments. The SSP-01 dataset is used
throughout the whole experiments and other two datasets are
used for further exploring the payment’s statistics in RTB. In
all datasets, bids are expressed as cost-per-mille (CPM) – the
measurement corresponds to the value of 1000 impressions.
The SSP-01 dataset contains 31 ad slots and their transac-
tions cover from 8 days to 20 days. Three ad slots (i.e., Slot-
25, Slot-26 and Slot-28) have only 8 days (172 consecutive
hours) bidding data, and each contains about 58000 auctions.
There are 10 ad slots have 20 days (447 consecutive hours)
bidding data, and each contains about 130000 to 140000
auctions. In experiments, we randomly select a delivery day
for an ad slot so the campaigns reported from that day will be
used as the test set and guaranteed contracts can be requested
and sold 7 days in advance. Therefore, for the slots with only
8 days data, their delivery days are set to be the 8th day.
The prediction of the supply of and demand for impressions
in the delivery period will be discussed next. However, it
should be noted that forecasting is not our primary intention
of this paper. Therefore, we choose a learning period that
is close to the delivery day so that the estimated parameters
will be more accurate for the evaluation purpose.
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Figure 4. Empirical examples of using surface regression models to
predict demand in the delivery day for an ad slot in the SSP-01 dataset:
(a) PNR(5,5); (b) PNR(2,3); (c) LQR.
B. Parameters Estimation
Several parameters of the proposed model, such as Q,
S, ξ and φ(·), whose values can be learned from data.
Fig. 5 presents an empirical example about the evolution of
payment price, supply and demand over time, which is based
on a hourly scale. The time series show obvious periodical
patterns, and we see a high relevance between payment and
the levels of supply and demand. The peak period is between
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Figure 5. An empirical example of estimating φ(ξ) for an ad slot in the
SSP-01 dataset where the resampling rate is 3/2.
8:00 and 14:00 every day. This ﬁnding is not surprising
and is not difﬁcult to explain because these hours lie in
the normal working hours and there are a lot of usage of
computers and Internet, and therefore, generating a large
volume of site visits. However, this periodical pattern will
be a little difﬁcult to predict if we only consider a single time
variable because the time series change based on a 24-hour
cycle.
In experiments, we divide the time effect into two com-
ponents: daily effect and hourly effect. Hence, two time
variables are considered for prediction. Fig. 4 illustrates the
surface regressions that we perform on the training data of
an ad slot to predict the next day’s demand. We mainly test
two types of regression models: (1) polynomial regression
(PNR) [25]; local quadratic regression (LQR) [26]. Table II
presents the evaluation results of the surface regression
models on the training data, where PNR(1,5) and PNR(2,4)
perform best for demand and supply prediction, respectively.
To learn φ(·), we use the RLWR model [12]. Fig. 5
illustrates an empirical example of estimating the expected
per-impression payment given the competition level ξ. In
the regression, we resample the data at the rate 3/2. It is
worth noting that: (1) φ(·) and ξ are not linearly correlated;
(2) a higher competition level will give a higher expected
payment price, and this price will converge to a certain level.
However, we can not obtain a monotone curve for φ(·) –
sometimes, a lower competition level will give a slightly
higher expected payment. This is because RTB campaigns
have been contributed by different advertisers and they
have different values on the same impression. The general
payment-demand pattern is consistent with our intuitive
understanding and the auction theory. In experiments, we
learn ψ(·) and π(·) in the same way.
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C. Results
In experiments, the guaranteed buy requests are modelled
by a homogeneous Poisson process at the intensity rate QT .
This rate can be time-dependent. However, as mentioned in
Section III, the demand arrival won’t affect the truth that the
proposed model can increase the publisher’s revenue. The
worst case is that no impression has been sold in advance,
and the publisher will auction off all impressions in RTB
once they are created. Table III shows the payment statistics
of winning advertisers in RTB on three datasets. As the
advertiser’s bid represents her value in the SP auction, the
ratio of payment to value shows how well RTB differentiates
advertisers and if there is any room to increase revenue
through guaranteed contracts. Figs. 6-8 present empirical
examples on how the guaranteed buy requests are accepted
based on the dynamic reserve prices. In Fig. 6, the total
revenue is just slightly increased as only a few impressions
are sold through guaranteed contracts. Figs. 7-8 show the sit-
uations when more buy requests are accepted and how they
affect the evolution of reserve prices. The distance between
the price of buy request and the reserve price is the revenue
increase for an impression. Recall that we have discussed
the non-linearity and non-monotonicity relationship between
φ(·) and ξ, here we can see the reserve prices are not always
increasing or decreasing over time. This is different to active
PG [12] or airline tickets booking [7] where prices over time
have a monotone pattern.
The overall results of revenue performance are sum-
marised in Table IV. Apart from estimating the model
parameters using the training data, we also use data in the
delivery period, for example, using actual bids to estimate
bid distribution, using the actual total supply and demand to
estimate the per-impression demand at the given guaranteed
price. If we use data in the delivery period, the predicted
RTB revenue RPredictRTB would be very close to, however, in
our case is slightly smaller than that from real data RRTB.
This shows the variation of the model’s approximation and
there are 4 slots without revenue growth. In other cases, the
revenues are all increasing, validating our revenue analysis.
The prediction of future supply and demand is important for
the model’s performance, which can be further investigated
in future research.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses a computational framework of selling
a publisher’s impressions through guaranteed contracts for
display advertising. An advertiser can submit a guaranteed
buy request and the publisher makes decisions of whether
to sell an impression in advance based on a hidden reserve
price. The model assumes static supply and demand in the
future delivery period, and the decision making at each
request is based on the updated rebalanced supply and
demand. We show that the model can increase the publisher’s
revenue compared to only selling impressions in RTB and
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Figure 6. An empirical example from an ad slot in the SSP-01 dataset
where only a few guaranteed buy requests has been accepted.
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Figure 7. An empirical example from an ad slot in the SSP-01 dataset
where several guaranteed buy requests have been accepted.
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Figure 8. An empirical example from an ad slot in the SSP-01 dataset
where many guaranteed buy requests have been accepted.
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Table III
PAYMENT STATISTICS OF WINNING ADVERTISERS IN RTB.
Number of Ratio of payment Ratio of reserve
Dataset advertisers to winning bid price to payment
SSP-01 374 51.44% NA
SSP-02 NA 77.09% 0.01%
DSP 4 30.24% NA
Table IV
EXPECTED REVENUES.
Using data in the Learning data in
delivery period the training period
RPredict
PG+RTB
≥ RPredict
RTB
100% 100%
R
Predict
PG+RTB
≥ RRealRTB 80.77% 100%
(RPredictRTB −RRealRTB)/RRealRTB -0.07 26.17
validate the the model with SSP datasets as well as discuss
in details how to estimate the model parameters.
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